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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: PRINCIPLES AND TRENDS
CLAUDE R. SOWLE*
SOURCES OF THE PRIVILEGE
In the United States, the privilege against self-
incrimination is pervasive. The privilege is ex-
plicitly recognized not only in the Federal
Constitution' but also in the constitutions of 48
of our states.- The two remaining states, Iowa and
New Jersey, achieve the same result in different
ways. Iowa, in the absence of an express con-
stitutional provision, reads the privilege into the
due process clause of its constitution.3 New Jersey,
on the other hand, grants the privilege by statute.
4
Perhaps the most familiar wording of the priv-
ilege is that found in the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, which provides, among
other things, that "No person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ... ." Many of the states, in wording their
privileges, have copied the federal provision.
Others have not.5 Yet, both in general purport
and in basic interpretation, all of the privileges,
federal and state, essentially point in the same
direction.
Although, because of their pervasiveness and
rough uniformity, convenience might suggest that
we mentally allow the various privileges to co-
alesce, an accurate discussion of "the" privilege in
this country, in the broad sense, demands a
threshold recognition that each of the 51 individual
privileges marches forward with sturdy independ-
ence. Thus, each privilege is available only in the
jurisdiction granting it. Of course, to claim any-
thing more for the various state privileges would
be to undermine prevailing constitutional notions
* Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ.;
Editor-in-Chief of the JOURNAL.
I U. S. CONST. amend. V.
2 The state constitutional provisions are cited and
quoted in 8 WioGoRE, EVIDENCE §2252 n.3 (3d ed.
1940).
3 See Amana Society v. Selzer, 94 N.W.2d 337, 339
(Iowa 1959).
4 State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 620, 55 Atl. 743
(1903). See also State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 168-69,
142 A.2d 65, 70 (1958).
5 For a brief summary of the language of the various
constitutional provisions, see the text at notes 2 to 7 of
McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
which appears in the JOURNAL immediately following
this article.
of the proper role to be played by the individual
states, both among themselves and in their re-
lations with the federal government. And, although
something more, in theory at least, might have
been claimed for the federal privilege, it has been
settled law for well over one hundred years that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, just as the other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, is binding only upon the Federal
government. As the United States Supreme Court
reiterated near the turn of the century in Brorn
v. Walker, "[T]he [Federal] Constitution does not
operate upon a witness testifying in the state
courts, since we have held that the first eight
amendments are limitations only upon the powers
of Congress and the federal courts, and are not
applicable to the several states, except so far as the
Fourteenth Amendment may have made them
applicable. 6
A review of the sources of the privilege would be
incomplete without at least a brief consideration
of the Court's reference, in Browmn v. Walker, to
the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amend-
ment. For present purposes, the significant clauses
of that amendment are these:
1) "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States";7
and
2) "nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process
of law. . ... 8
In the context of our discussion, these clauses
translate into the following questions:
1) Is the privilege against self-incrimination a
"privilege" or "immunity" of United States
citizens which the states may not abridge?
and
2) Should a state deny one his life, liberty or
property without making the privilege
available to him, would such a deprivation
6 161 U. S. 591, 606 (1895). See also Feldman v.
United States, 322 U. S. 487, 490 (1943).7 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
8 Ibid.
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be without due process of law and hence a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?
The short, well-known, fifty-year-old answer to
both of these questions is "no"; the privilege
against self-incrimination, as embodied in the
Fifth Amendment, is not made applicable to the
states by virtue of either of these clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
9
The Supreme Court's narrow reading of "priv-
ileges" and "immunities" is acceptable to most as
a correct adherence to the limited role accorded
those terms by precedent. However, the Court's
conclusion that the privilege is not inherent in due
process is, to many, a debatable interpretation of
that constantly expanding phrase. That this
question probably will be revisited is evidenced by
the fact that when the issue last came before the
Supreme Court fourteen years ago, the minority
favoring recognition of the privilege as a basic
demand of Fourteenth Amendment due process
had grown from one to four justices.10
Nor is the question stripped of practical signifi-
cance by virtue of the fact that each state already
has a privilege of its own. A decision that the
Fourteenth Amendment required state recognition
of a privilege against self-incrimination would
permit the Supreme Court to become, for the
first time, an overseer of state activities touching
upon the privilege. And, although one might expect
this oversight to be both benevolent and restrained,
thus resulting in the fashioning of a Fourteenth
Amendment privilege which would be something
less than a mere carbon copy of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, the potential of such a new federal
power could not, of course, be ignored.
THE GENERAL SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE
Let us move from our review of the sources of
the privilege into a brief and very general dis-
cussion of its scope.
The privilege, irrespective of the differences in
wording which mark its various sources, seems
dearly to bestow its protection upon a defendant
on trial in a criminal case. However, it is ironic to
note parenthetically that even as recently as 75 or
80 years ago, he who stood accused of a crime was
the very one who did not need the protection of
any such privilege. For, until the latter half of the
nineteenth century, when legislatures began to
change the testimonial status of the accused, the
I Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).10 See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).
defendant was not a competent witness either for
or against himself."
Upon leaving the area of the accused and moving
into the domain of the ordinary witness, the
problems of interpretation become more difficult.
One must strain a bit with the words of the
various privileges in order to bring within their
ambit a witness who is not, at the time he invokes
the privilege, a defendant in a criminal case. To
refine the problem in terms of a question: Is the
privilege available to one who does not have the
status of an accused but who is asked, under oath,
to relate facts which, if divulged, might directly
or indirectly result in his henceforth becoming an
accused? Words such as "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself," and, to a lesser extent,
words such as "No person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself,"
seem either to compel or at least to suggest strongly
that the privilege is available to a criminal de-
fendant and to no one else. However, the cases are
to the contrary. Out of a mixture of history,
precedent and policy has come the well established
doctrine that the ordinary witness is privileged not
to answer incriminating questions. 12 Moreover, he
not only may leave such questions unanswered at
any stage of a judicial proceeding, criminal or civil,
but also he may invoke his privilege in connection
with other official proceedings, such as adminis-
trative hearings and legislative investigations. 13
11 For a discussion of this change and the reasons
therefor, see 2 WIGmORE,.EvmENcE §579 (3d ed. 1940).
The various statutes are collected in 2 id. W48 n.2.
12 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §2252 (1) (a) ("A clause
exempting a person from being 'a witness against
himself' protects as well a witness as a party accused in
the cause; that is, it is immaterial whether the prosecu-
tion is then and there 'against himself' or not. So also
a clause exempting 'the accused' protects equally a
mere witness.")
1 See In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App.2d 82, 59 P.2d 213
(1936) ("When the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States was first proposed by Mr.
Madison, the proposed provision read, 'No person...
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.'
The accounts of the debates show that this was deemed
to be too broad and the proposal was amended by
adding the words 'in any criminal case.' . . . The
wording of the proposal as amended may not have
been happily chosen for undoubtedly the privilege
intended to be given was the common-law privilege
against self-incrimination in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, and the courts have liberally construed the
various constitutional provisions to confer such privi-
lege. As stated by Wigmore in section 2252, at page
834, the variety of phrasing found in the various Con-
stitutions 'neither enlarges nor narrows the scope of
the privilege as already accepted, understood, andjudicially developed in the common law.' The privilege
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Since the various constitutional privileges accord
protection to any "person," or to the "accused,"
or to a "witness," this would seem to imply that
the privilege is not available to non-human enti-
ties. And the cases, which are not numerous,
clearly point in this direction. Corporations were
the first bloodless creatures to feel the sting of this
literal reading of the privilege, and the rule there
fashioned imposed upon the corporation a duty to
deliver up its books and records for official in-
spection even though corporate criminality might
thereby be disclosed.14 Moreover, the net was held
to be sufficiently large to catch also the agent who
holds in a representative capacity corporate docu-
ments which incidentally disclose the agent's own
criminality. He cannot, according to the rule,
interpose a personal claim of privilege and thereby
lock up the corporate file cabinets. 5 However, for
some time the rationale of these corporate decisions
was not completely clear. Were they primarily an
outgrowth of the visitorial powers normally re-
served to the sovereign who permits the corpora-
tion to be born? Or were they based upon a strict
reading of the constitutional phraseology and its
history? Clarification came in a 1944 decision of
the United States Supreme Court which denied
the privilege to an unincorporated association-a
labor union. In this decision, United States v.
White, the Court stated: "The test ... is whether
one can fairly say under all the circumstances
that a particular type of organization has a char-
acter so impersonal in the scope of its membership
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or
represent the purely private or personal interests
of its constituents, but rather to embody their
common or group interests only."' 6 The White
case thus makes it clear that the general rule has a
base much broader than the state's visitorial
power over corporations.17 However, the language
then is... accorded to all witnesses in all proceedings
and has no relation to the rights of parties .... ") See
also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924)
(civil proceeding); Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S.
190 (1955) (legislative hearing); Smith v. United
States, 337 U. S. 137, 150 (1949) (administrative pro-
ceeding).
"4Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
Is Id. at 382.
16 322 U. S. 694, 701 (1944).
17 The principle has been applied to a political party,
Communist Party of the U. S. v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1955), to a
partnership, United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp.
327 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), and to the board of trustees of
the Bail Fund of Civil Rights Congress of New York,
Field v. United States, 193 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1951).
of the decision, in seeming to place emphasis upon
the size and impersonal nature of the artificial
entity, rather than upon the mere fact of its non-
human shell, raises certain additional questions.
For example, is the privilege still available to the
small partnership, or to the close corporation
spawned by promises of tax savings? 8 Suffice it to
say that although the basis of the rule and the
direction in which it is proceeding have become
clear, the exact scope of the doctrine is far from a
settled question.
Our discussion thus far has indicated that, for
purposes of analysis and clarity, the privilege can
and should be divided into two parts: (1) the
privilege of an accused person and (2) the privilege
of an ordinary witness. Perhaps it will now be
profitable to discuss separately and in slightly
more detail these two branches of the privilege.
THE PRIVILEGE OF TE ACcUSED
As indicated above, the words of the various
constitutional provisions clearly cover the de-
fendant in a criminal case. However, to record
accurately the dimensions of this shelter for the
accused, one must take cognizance, also, of those
statutes which, during the last century, wiped
away the testimonial incompetence of the criminal
defendant. This legislation did not merely bestow
competency where previously there was none. It
usually provided, in addition, that notwithstanding
his newly-won status, the accused could elect not
to utilize it, that is, he could be called as a witness
at his own request and not otherwise.' 9 This, of
course, is something more than the ordinary wit-
ness's option to pick and choose, at his peril,
among a field of incriminating as well as non-
incriminating questions. It is, instead, a somewhat
broader shield, a shield designed to accomplish a
complete prohibition of inquiry, if the accused so
elects. Thus, the statutes granted something more
than a mere privilege against self-incrimmiation;
18 in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp.
418, 421 (N.D. Cal. 1948), the court refused to apply
the lVhite doctrine to a small family partnership. The
court stated: "It may be that some partnerships,
which have a large number of partners.., might ...
take on the habilaments of an association or corpora-
tion. But certainly this small family partnership does
not reach such a stature."19 The words of ILL. Rv. STAT., ch. 38, §734, are
typical: "No person shall be disqualified as a witness in
any criminal case or proceeding by reason of his interest
in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise... :
Provided, however, that a defendant in any criminal
case or proceeding shall only at his own request be
deemed a competent witness .... "
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they granted, instead, a privilege not to testify at
all. Perhaps a question is appropriate at this
point: Is this broader privilege of the accused not
to testify at all, as opposed to the narrower priv-
ilege of the ordinary witness not to incriminate
himself, merely a creature of legislative grace,
and thus subject to legislative withdrawal? Or, on
the other hand, are these statutes actually codifi-
cations of a broader constitutional privilege for
the accused? Demands for a narrowing of the
privilege may someday cause legislatures to present
this question to the courts. It strikes me as a point
upon which reasonable men, and indeed reasonable
courts, could differ.N
Upon returning from conjecture as to the status
of these statutes to the more immediate problem
of their interpretation, we at once meet the ques-
tion of who can qualify as an accused person. Is the
term to be read narrowly and thus limited to one
against whom formal criminal proceedings have
been instituted? Or are the statutes broad enough
to cover also the potential defendant as, for ex-
ample, the prime suspect who is ordered to appear
before the grand jury or at the coroner's inquest?
Although there is some authority to the contrary,
most courts read the term "accused" literally;
hence, the suspect, or potential defendant, cannot
refuse to be sworn, although he may, of course,
refuse to answer all incriminating questions which
are put to him.21
Let us assume, however, that we have a situation
in which an accused, on trial for a criminal offense,
has decided to invoke his privilege to remain off
20 One court has considered the question and held
that the broader privilege of the accused has a con-
stitutional foundation. See United States v. Housing
Foundation of America, 176 F.2d 665,666 (3d Cir. 1949)
("Compelling the defendant Westfield to take the
stand and to testify in a criminal prosecjition against
him is so fundamental an error that the judgment must
be reversed and a new trial ordered .... The error
made arises from confusing the privilege of any witness
not to give incriminating answers with the right of the
accused not to take the stand in a criminal prosecution
against him. Both come within the protection of the...
5th Amendment ... The plain difference between the
privilege of witness and accused is that the latter may
not be required to take the stand at all. We need only
say in this case that the accused was required to take
the stand and to testify over his objection and in viola-
tion of his right protected both by the Constitution
and the common law.").
21 In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App.2d 82, 59 P.2d 213
(1936); Post v. United States, 161 U. S. 583, 587 (1894).
Contra: State v. Allison 116 Mont. 352; People v.
Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y.S. 133 (1908)
(for later legislative and judicial developments con-
cerning the New York situation, see People v. Steuding,
185 N.Y.S.2d 34 (App. Div. 1959)).
the stand. To what extent can the prosecution seek
to dent or perhaps even to strip away part of this
suit of armour which encases the defendant?
Much energy has been expended by prosecutors
in an effort to persuade the courts to limit the
privilege of the accused to freedom from testi-
monial compulsion, thus leaving the prosecution
free to compel the defendant's assistance in con-
nection with the production of non-testimonial
evidence. Under this dichotomy, the defendant
could not, of course, be compelled to take the
stand and testify (or to produce in court, under
judicial order, private papers and perhaps other
objects); however, the accused could be com-
pelled to stand up in court in order to facilitate a
witness's identification of him, to display a scar,
to don certain apparel, to assume a certain posi-
tion and, perhaps, even to provide a specimen of
his handwriting or his voice. If generalization is
possible in this uncertain borderland of the priv-
ilege, it is to the effect that the prosecutors have
met with a fair degree of success. The efforts of
defendants to block such courtroom demonstra-
tions (and, in the same vein, to suppress the results
of demonstrations and tests conducted outside the
courtroom) frequently have been unavailing.2
However, the decisions are far from uniform.
Professor McCormick, in an attempt to bring
order out of apparent conflict, has suggested that
some courts appear to draw a line between en-
forced passivity on the part of the accused and
enforced activity on his part. That is, they have
regarded as unprivileged those things involving
passive submission, while recognizing as privileged
those activities requiring the active cooperation
of the accused.n Inasmuch as this shadowy corner
of the privilege provides an ideal battleground
for those who would limit the privilege and those
who would expand its scope, we can safely assume
that it will be productive of conflict for some time
to come.
In another area of potential limitation upon the
privilege, defendants have met with considerably
more solicitude, particularly at the hands of the
legislatures. Many jurisdictions, in an effort' to
minimize the disagreeable legal consequences
flowing from an invocation of the privilege, have
provided by statute that the failure of the accused
2 The cases are collected in INBAU, SELF-INcRInUtNA-
TION: WHAT CAN AN AccuSED PERSON BE COMPELLED
To Do? (1950). See also MAGUIRE, EvmmzNE OF GUILT
§2.04 (1959).
22 See McCoRmicK, EvDyENcE §126 (1954).
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to take the stand shall not be made a subject of
comment and shall not create any presumption
against him.24 However, in recent years the outcry
for repeal of such legislation has been substantial,
and several states have seen fit to allow comment,
although, to be sure, the inference thus permitted
is merely a prop under other evidence pointing
toward guilt, rather than a substitute for it.5
Moreover, it should be noted that those who would
do away with the no-comment statutes must be
something more than merely effective lobbyists.
They must also contend with the courts, for several
statutes permitting comment have been declared
unconstitutional on the ground that to comment
is to coerce, and to coerce is to compel, albeit in a
somewhat indirect way.
6
In concluding our discussion of the privilege of
the accused, let us focus our attention upon the
defendant who, rather than remaining mute, elects
instead to take the stand in his own behalf. The
cases hold that by offering himself as a witness, the
accused thereby assumes an obligation to respond
to all relevant inquiries concerning the crime
charged.2 The phrase, "relevant inquiries con-
cerning the crime charged," is broader than might
at first appear. Thus, it may include within its
coverage not only questions directly related to the
offense with which the defendant is charged, but
i no in quirie, concerning nother unnrnsecfd
misdeeds of the accused, so long as such extrinsic
offenses appear to bear upon some aspect of the
principal crime, such as motive, intent, premedita-
tion, and so forth .2 Generalization becomes more
difficult, however, when we inquire into the pro-
priety of questioning the defendant concerning
misconduct which bears directly upon the question
of his credibility, and thus only indirectly upon the
"4 For example, Illinois provides: "[The defendant's]
neglect to testify shall not create any presumption
against him, nor shall the court permit any reference or
comment to be made to or upon such neglect." ILL.
REv. STATS., ch. 38, §734.
2" California effected the change by constitutional
amendment (" ... in any criminal case, whether the
defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to
deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the
case against him may be commented upon by the court
and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or
the jury ...." CALIF. CONST., Art. I, §13.). Iowa and
Vermont have statutes permitting comment.
26 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620,
15 N.E.2d 662 (1938), and State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178,
266 N.W. 116 (1936). Contra: State v. Baker, 115 Vt.
94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947), and State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa
361, 283 N.W. 917 (1939).
78 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §2276(2) (3d ed. 1940).
8 Ibid.
question of his guilt. Some courts permit such
questioning, thus requiring that the defendant
witness step our entirely from behind his shield.2
Other courts hold, however, that once the pros-
ecutor begins to inquire into criminal conduct of
the defendant bearing solely upon his truth-telling
potential, the accused may, by a claim of the
privilege, turn away the questions. 0
TIE PRIVILEGE OF THE ORDINARY WVITNESS
To round our our discussion of the privilege,
let us turn now to a discussion of the privilege of
the ordinary witness.
Although, again, generalization is difficult and
perhaps may be misleading, I will risk the follow-
ing statement of the scope of protection usually
accorded an ordinary witness: An ordinary wit-
ness, unlike the accused, cannot refuse to take the
stand; however, once on the stand, the ordinary
witness is privileged not to disclose facts involving
criminal liability, or its equivalent, in the juris-
diction in which the disclosure is sought. Or, to
state the rule negatively: The ordinary witness
cannot be required to give answers or to furnish,
and authenticate by his oath, personal documents
which will create the danger of his conviction of a
crime in the jurisdiction seeking such answers or
documents.
best be achieved by a consideration of what is not
covered by the witness's privilege.
The reference to "criminal liability" and to
"conviction of a crime" in the foregoing statement
-of the witness's privilege is a reflection of certain
basic limitations which find general support in
the cases. Thus, the courts hold that the witness
must give answers which might subject him to
civil liability, at least so long as the civil liability
involves penalties intended to be remedial rather
than punitive.3' Moreover, the witness generally
is not privileged to shrink from answers which,
although nonincriminating, would tend to disgrace
or degrade him.32
However, the most limiting aspect of the general
rule, at least potentially, is that portion which
holds that the witness is not protected against
2People v. Casey, 72 N.Y. 393, 398, 399 (1878).
30 State v. Bragg, 140 W.Va. 585, 601-02, 611, 87
S.E.2d 689, 700, 704 (1955).
" Boston & M. Ry. Co. v. State, 75 N.H. 513, 77
Atl. 996 (1910); 8 WIGMORE, EvmNcE §2254 (3d ed.
1940).
"In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949); 3
WiGmORE, EvIDENCE §987 (3d ed. 1940).
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factual disclosures which create a danger of
criminal liability in jurisdictions other than the one
in which the privilege is claimed. By virtue of this
limitation, the privilege is thus not available to a
witness in a state or federal proceeding who fears
incrimination only under the laws of a foreign
country,n or to a witness in a state proceeding who
fears incrimination only under the laws of another
state or under federal law,34 or to a witness in a
federal proceeding who fears incrimination only
under state law. 35 Several additional comments
concerning this portion of the general rule seem to
be in order. For one thing, the earlier decisions
supporting this limitation are leavened by al-
lusions to the remoteness of potential prosecution
in another jurisdiction.36 However, later decisions
leave one with the feeling that, although the aspect
of remoteness was once looked upon as a question
of fact, it has now hardened into a presumption of
law.n We should also note that the limitation
imposed by the general rule is clearly an out-
growth of policy, for the words of the various
constitutional provisions certainly do not compel
such a result. Thus, it is not surprising that there
is some authority contrary to the general rule.
The following statement from a 1947 decision of
the Supreme Court of Michigan captures the
rationale of the minority courts:
"We are of the opinion that the privilege against
self-incrimination exonerates from disclosure
whenever there is a probability of prosecution in
State or federal jurisdictions .... It seems like
a travesty on verity to say that one is not sub-
jected to self-incrimination when compelled to
give testimony in a State judicial proceeding
which testimony may forthwith be used against
him in a federal criminal prosecution."
38
A highly practical comment may be .appropriate
at this point: Because court and counsel generally
are not free to compel the witness to disclose the
exact geographical locus of his fear, the limitation
we are discussing may be more apparent than
real. Reality swiftly returns, however, when the
11 Republic of Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318,
164 N.E. 345 (1928).
See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
'5 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
36 See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 606(1896).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141
(1932).
38 People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich 645, 651, 29 N.W.2d
284, 287 (1947). To the same effect, see Com. v. Rhine,
303 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Ky. 1957), and State ex rel
Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 S.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
so-called witness immunity statutes, which are
discussed below, come into play.
Assuming, then, that the witness possesses a
privilege of the approximate scope just suggested,
it is appropriate to consider next the test to be
applied by the courts in determining when a
particular question may go unanswered on the
ground that a response would tend to incriminate
the witness.
It is a general rule in the state courts that an
invocation of the privilege will be sanctioned only
where it appears probable that the witness has
committed a crime under the law of the forum
and that the fact called for constitutes or forms
an essential part of that crime.38
In the federal courts, on the other hand, the
witness will find that his refusals to answer are
considered in light of somewhat more liberal
criteria. There, the witness is free to conceal not
only incriminating facts but also dues or leads to
such facts, that is, sources or means by which
evidence of the witness's criminal complicity may
be obtained. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit recently set forth the federal
approach in these terms:
"It is enough [to justify a claim of the privilege]
that the trial court be shown by argument how
conceivably a prosecutor, building on the
seemingly harmless answer, might proceed step
by step to link the witness with some crime...
and that this suggested course and scheme of
linkage not seem incredible in the circumstances
of the particular case.... In performing this
duty, the judge cannot be a skeptic, but must
be acutely aware that in the deviousness of
crime and its detection, incrimination may be
approached and achieved by obscure and un-
likely lines of inquiry." 40
Closely related to our present discussion is the
problem of waiver. just as a witness may balk too
soon, so too may he balk too late. Thus, one can
observe today an increasing tendency on the part
of the well-coached witness to stop early lest he
be enticed onto the trail of a transaction which,
under the doctrines of waiver, he may be forced
to follow through to its bitter end. One might
properly characterize this current spate of witness
timidity as unduly cautious, and perhaps even
39The cases are collected and discussed in
McCoizwcK, EVmENCE §129 (1954).
40 United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d
Cir. 1952). See also Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 488 (1951).
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improper, in light of the established doctrine that
waiver occurs only where the witness has disclosed
at least one incriminating fact concerning a par-
ticular transaction.4' But perhaps as the definition
of "incriminating" tends to become broader, it
supports in its wake a correspondingly broad
concept of waiver." At any rate, the waiver-
motivated refusals proceed apace and with a
minimum of judicial interference.
A discussion of the privilege of the ordinary
witness would be incomplete without at least brief
reference to a significant by-product of the so-
called witness immunity statutes which have been
enacted by both the federal and state govern-
ments." Under such a statute, the government
involved may grant to a witness immunity from
prosecution growing out of any testimony given
by the witness. After thus removing the danger
of incrimination, the sovereign involved may
compel the witness to disclose fully the details of
any matters or transactions under investigation.
Of course, the breadth of this immunity may be
somewhat illusory. A particular state can do no
more than grant immunity from prosecution by
it; it cannot, of course, grant immunity from
prosecution by other states or by the federal
government. On the other hand, the federal
government, at least in areas of national concern,
may grant immunity against both federal and
state prosecution;" however, as a matter of policy,
it may not always choose to do so.
Let us take the case, then, of a witness who,
under a grant of immunity from state prosecution,
is compelled to answer questions put to him by
41See 8 \VWGmoRE, EVIDEN cE §2276(1) and (2) (b)
(3d ed. 1940).
42 This is particularly true if waiver is held to occur
when one discloses a fact he properly could have with-
held under claim of privilege.
43 The statutes are collected in 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§2281 (3d ed. 1940).
44 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
state authorities. Although the information given
cannot later afford the basis for a state prosecution
of the witness,'quite possibly the information may
subsequently be utilized elsewhere, as, for example,
in a federal court prosecution of the witness for
violations of federal law incidentally disclosed in
his state testimony. Notwithstanding this for-
bidding possibility, the witness generally will not
be permitted to invoke his state privilege since
he has been granted full immunity against subse-
quent state prosecution.45 Nor can he invoke his
federal privilege since, under United States
Supreme Court rulings mentioned earlier, the
Fifth Amendment is available only in federal
proceedings.46 Moreover, the federal government,
according to the Supreme Court, is entitled to use,
in a subsequent federal prosecution, testimony
compelled by state authorities under a grant of
immunity from state prosecution.0 It readily can
be seen, then, that out witness is on the horns of
an uninviting dilemma: Either (1) he can, not-
withstanding the grant of state immunity, refuse
to answer, whereupon he may be jailed by the
state for contempt, or (2) he can answer the state
authorities, whereupon he may find that he has
in effect confessed himself into a federal peni-
tentiary. Thus, a state government and the federal
government-two independent sovereigns acting
legally within their respective spheres of authority
-- ,can, by virtue of the total effect of their separate
actions, deny to a witness his general privilege
not to incriminate himself, although both
sovereigns are constitutionally required to preserve
just such a privilege.41
46 See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
46 See notes 9 and 10 supra. See also Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
47 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
48 The difficult problems in this area are fully explored
in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), and
Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
